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Since President Trump took office in 2017, he has implemented dozens of restrictive 
immigration laws at the expense of women and people of color. The rapid barrage of policies has 
confounded international and domestic commentators alike, prompting outrage and a sense of 
powerlessness. In this thesis, I interrogate the historical underpinnings of Trump-era immigration 
policies to demonstrate the deep-seated racism and sexism that have informed American 
immigration policy dating back to the nineteenth century. I apply an intersectional framework to 
the 2020 birth tourism regulation, which discriminates against women from non-Western 
countries, and well as interviews with two women resettling as refugees in Oklahoma City who 
navigate the U.S. resettlement program’s emphasis on employment at the expense of language. 
In doing so, I present immigration policy as a political tool that disproportionately impacts 
women of color and whose structural violences continue long past a migrant’s arrival in a new 
location. In centering intersectionality and agency alongside structural violence, I contribute to 
literature on “borderscapes,” which seeks to amplify the possibilities for hope, opposition, and 
counter-hegemonic political agency in the context of exclusionary globalization. 
 
 
Keywords: birth tourism, borderscapes, forced migration, Visa Waiver Program, refugee 
resettlement, intersectionality, immigration policy, birthright citizenship
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Chapter One. Making Sense of U.S. Immigration Policy: Violence, Agency, and 
Intersectionality in Policy, Past and Present 
Despite the expansion and increasing flows of people, capital, and ideas across borders 
under the current moment of globalization, the past three decades have witnessed an acceleration 
of border construction and the re-entrenchment of the nation-state’s role in geopolitical order. In 
addition to physical barriers, state and non-state actors implement legal mechanisms, economic 
restrictions, and myriad other means of controlling, denying or deterring entry into certain 
spaces. Border conflicts the world over, ranging from India and Pakistan’s disagreement over 
Kashmir to Russia’s annexation of Crimea from the Ukraine, both Hong Kong’s and Taiwan’s 
contested sovereignty from China, and First Nations’ centuries-long fight to reclaim sovereignty 
from North American governments, have profound implications for people living within and 
outside of state borders. These conflicts and the violence they inflict upon human and nonhuman 
lives are enabled —indeed, created— by the systems of political power that the territorial 
boundary of “the border” represents. 
As a relatively recent phenomenon, what are the long-term implications of borders, 
especially for people seeking to move across them? In this thesis, I zoom out from “the border” 
to view the actors, structures, and environments that surround it. I look at the ways in which 
economic, political, and historical contexts converge to re/produce, challenge, or otherwise 
engage with the border as not simply a physical boundary, but also a discursive and political 
mechanism of control and contestation. 
In doing so, I frame the Trump administration’s restrictive approach to immigration 
policy within critical border studies scholarship that rejects the border as inevitable or apolitical, 
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and instead interrogates the material, discursive, and processual attributes that make borders sites 
of conflict, violence, generation, and hope. I focus on the 2020 birth tourism regulation and the 
U.S. refugee resettlement program to demonstrate that the Trump administration uses 
immigration policy as a political tool that produces both deliberate and inadvertent violence 
against certain bodies according to race, nationality and geopolitical relationships, and gender. 
Through policies that securitize and externalize America’s physical borders, the Trump 
administration pursues exclusionary prerogatives in ways that align with the generally taken-for-
granted role of national borders.  
Borders in Context: Material and Immaterial Processes of Power 
Although the contemporary state system assumes that people belong in particular states, 
the linkage between territory and sovereignty is a relatively recent phenomenon (Betts, 2015). 
Marking the end of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia codified 
what is now referred to as the Westphalian state system, or the use of territorial boundaries to 
denote sovereign entities. Through European colonization, the practice of denoting realms of 
governance with territorial demarcations proliferated into the current Westphalian state system 
(Jones et al., 2017; Benton, 2010). However, borders are not arbitrary lines drawn on maps or 
carved into earth; rather, they are the material and immaterial assertions of power that seek to 
contain, deter, or otherwise control human mobility. Borders can therefore be biopolitical as a 
way to control life or necropolitical as a way to control death (Foucault, 1979; Mbembe, 2003). 
In their many material and immaterial forms, borders are therefore inherently political sites of 
state sovereignty and power.  
The Materiality of Borders 
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Physically, borders inhibit or enable the movement of people, capital, and goods across 
space. In recent years, states have increasingly constructed structures such as walls and fences to 
mark their borders. Figure 1 below shows the exponential increase of global border walls since 
the end of World War II. Rather than timeless or inevitable, the proliferation of border walls is 
historically recent. 
Figure 1 
Number of Border Walls Globally, 1945-2015 
 
Source: Update by Elisabeth Vallet, Zoé Barry, and Josselyn Guillarmou of statistics included in 




Furthermore, physical borders have taken on increasingly securitized and explicitly 
violent forms, particularly since September 11th, 2001. Border securitization in the U.S. has 
included the expansion of fences at the southern border by 2,639 miles between 2006 and 2016 
(Jones, 2016, p. 37); mass deployment of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) officers and military 
forces (Pierce, 2019); and the deployment of military troops (Jones, 2016). These trends are not 
unique to the U.S.: Hungary has constructed a border fence between it and Serbia, India has 
reinforced its borders with Bangladesh, and Greece has even considered erecting a floating 
border off its shores (Goździak, 2019; Jones, 2009; Reuters, 2020). Nations therefore seek to 
deny transnational movement by making their physical borders larger, more formidable, and 
more dangerous.  
Borders are also materially enacted in the spaces surrounding borders, thereby extending 
the physical reach of the border. For example, the U.S. policy of “prevention through deterrence” 
prevents undocumented migrants away from crossing into the U.S. at safe border sites; in doing 
so, the policy essentially channels people through the harsh, arid Sonoran Desert in the American 
southwest on a journey that many do not survive (De León, 2015). While the border itself may 
be a discrete line or structure, spaces surrounding it also become “fertile territories for 
understanding how exception is constructed and contested by different actors” (De León, Gokee, 
and Schubert, 2015, p. 453). These borderlands become spatial extensions of border conflict, 
with often violent implications for the people living in the borderlands (Anzaldúa, 1987; Grundy-
Warr, 1993; Sundberg, 2008; De León, 2015).    
Borders as Process 
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In addition to its material attributes, critical border studies scholars also interrogate the 
immaterial attributes of borders, focusing especially on the border as a process and as discourse. 
In his seminal article “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International 
Relations Theory” (1994), John Agnew argues that, in conceptualizing statehood as a fixed unit 
whose territorial bounds contain society and separate the foreign from the domestic, analyses 
obscure important economic, social, and other components of global affairs. Similarly, in their 
introduction to a Geopolitics special issue entitled “Critical Border Studies: Broadening and 
Deepening the ‘Lines in the Sand’ Agenda,” Parker and Vaughan-Williams (2012) express their 
ambition to decenter the border –that is, “to problematise the border not as taken-for-granted 
entity, but precisely as a site of investigation… [the border] is never simply ‘present’, nor fully 
established, nor obviously accessible. Rather, it is manifold and in a constant state of becoming” 
(p. 728). These scholars and others understand the border not as a static line demarcating state 
territory, but as a dynamic and deliberate execution of political power that is simultaneously 
ongoing and inextricable from prerogatives of domination and control.  
This “processual turn” expands the analytical rigor of critical border studies in two key 
ways. First, treating borders as an ongoing process can help explain the changing attributes of 
particular borders; for example, the U.S.-Mexico border prior to 9/11 is difficult to reconcile 
with the increasingly violent, militarized border today. Understanding this border beyond its role 
as a spatial demarcation requires attention to the shifting geopolitical contexts and the ways in 
which those transform the character of the border. Second, understanding borders as processes 
necessitates attention to the actors involved in re/making borders. Rather than treating borders as 
inevitable or apolitical, the border-as-process perspective interrogates the power-laden 
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construction of borders. Following this “processual turn” in critical border studies, I therefore 
refer to the practices of constructing, enacting, and reinforcing borders as bordering.  
 According to Brambilla and Jones (2019), “the border produces, contains, and is 
traversed by complex entangled tensions in a condensed form that make the border itself a prime 
field to advance understanding of violence and conflict” (p. 3). Images of machine-gun wielding 
border patrol officers, barbed wire, or electric fences are explicitly violent and evoke visceral 
responses of fear, dispossession, and division (Correa, 2013). However, border violence is also 
structural1 and implicitly experienced across sites and scales. For example, Walia (2013) 
identifies the West as the progenitor of borders via not just colonization, but also settler 
colonialism, military occupation, and neoliberal imperialism that produce and sustain systems of 
geopolitical inequality. Jones (2016) also identifies the violent structural implications of the 
border, stating that: 
The existence of the border itself produces the violence that surrounds it. The 
border creates the economic and jurisdictional discontinuities that have come to 
be seen as its hallmarks, providing an impetus for the movement of people, goods, 
drugs, weapons, and money across it. The hardening of the border through new 
security practices is the source of the violence, not a response to it. (p. 5). 
Border violence is embedded within, and constitutive of, inter-ethnic conflict in postcolonial 
Africa, land disputes in the Americas, and racism against people of color predating the founding 
of the U.S. This paper focuses predominantly on the co-constitution of structural violence and 
bordering systems in order to demonstrate the insidious, often taken-for-granted violent 
underpinnings of exclusionary immigration policies. 
 
1 I follow Farmer (2005) in defining structural violence as “a broad rubric that includes a host of offensives against 
human dignity: extreme and relative poverty, social inequalities ranging from racism to gender inequality, and the 
more spectacular forms of violence that are uncontestedly human rights abuses” (p. 34). 
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Securitization, Externalization, and Humanitarian Governance  
Border studies scholars understand borders as differentially porous (Paasi, 2012; 
Mezzadra and Neilson, 2011; Paasi, 2018). That is, resources, capital and goods as well as 
certain bodies move unimpeded across borders, while other bodies are rendered immobile in 
ways that present risks to life. Despite arguments from globalists such as Thomas Friedman 
(2005) that globalization has leveled global inequality as capital, ideas, and people move rapidly 
across borders, people do not have equal access to these forms of mobility, further marginalizing 
the already marginalized and aggravating social inequalities. Whether a person’s citizenship 
status prevents them from leaving and re-entering a country (as was the case for a family 
member of one of this study’s participants), a city’s lack of public transportation prevents some 
residents from accessing grocery markets, or the rapid spread of a pandemic leaves asylum 
seekers stranded in unsafe environments due to closed borders, crossing borders is not uniformly 
accessible. 
This differential porosity is not apolitical; rather, political actors rely on the practices of 
border securitization, border externalization, and the cooptation of humanitarian discourse to 
shape borders aligned with their prerogatives. While state actors and governments are by no 
means the sole actors involved in constructing this discourse, I focus here on state policies and 
practices that work together to legitimize restrictive policy and practice, especially regarding 
immigration and transnational movement. Supported by the media and crisis language, the 
practices of border securitization, externalization, and pseudo-humanitarianism converge in the 
increased traction of anti-immigration discourse globally.  
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Especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the advent of post-9/11 geopolitics, 
states increasingly use discourses of national security to consolidate national borders (Bigo and 
Tsoukala, 2008; Hyndman and Mountz, 2008). According to Karyotis (2007), security is a 
speech act that “occurs when a political actor pushes an area of ‘normal politics’ into the security 
realm by using the rhetoric of existential threat, in order to justify the adoption of ‘emergency’ 
measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics” (p. 3). That is, political 
actors can co-opt the language of security to produce threats. When a state does this, it creates 
the opportunity to act in ways that would otherwise be normatively unacceptable (Agamben, 
2003). Hyndman and Mountz (2008) argue that this discourse enables governments to shift 
immigration issues from the legal to the political domain, making transnational (im)mobility 
subject to volatile political contexts. 
For example, states use the security discourse to legitimate policies and practices that 
deter, redirect, or detain migrants as they attempt to cross transnational borders (Hirsch and Bell, 
2017; Effeney and Mansouri, 2014; De León, 2015). Australia, for example, has forged 
agreements through which it provides financial support to Indonesia, Nauru, and other states 
who, in exchange, house asylum seekers that would otherwise seek to enter Australia. Similarly, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico have consented to accept asylum seekers at U.S. 
borders, regardless of whether or not that is in the best interest of the asylum seeker. States rely 
on the discourse of national security to present these policies as protective measures and, in 
making migration political rather than legal, create new opportunities to control mobility and 
subtly erode human rights norms. 
The use of border securitization has also enabled a process of border externalization in 
which states “offshore” their national borders beyond their territorial bounds. Examples include 
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U.S. Customs and Border Protection pre-screening sites in airports abroad, European Union (EU) 
processing centers in North Africa that aim to separate legitimate from illegitimate asylum 
claims before arrival in the EU, and even a plan to implement a floating barrier between Turkey 
and Greece to deter migrants from entering Europe. These measures, which at the least risk 
invading privacy and at the worst result in loss of life, are presented as necessary for national 
security. What is critical, however, is that these efforts transport the border outside of territorial 
bounds, therefore further complicating the character of “the border” and its role in global 
systems. 
Further, reflecting Jones’ (2016) argument that the border itself generates the violence 
that surrounds it, the externalization of borders too generates and exacerbates violence. For 
example, Lemberg-Pedersen (2017) discusses the EU’s construction of processing centers in 
Libya that indefinitely detain or redirect asylum seekers, forcing asylum seekers into extended 
precarity. Instead of providing a solution to displacement, these processing centers aim to solve 
the EU’s influx of asylum seekers by externalizing its borders and containing asylum seekers 
between the territory of the EU and of Libya. Through securitization and externalization, state 
actors reproduce, extend, and otherwise shift the spatial and political character of the border from 
a territorial marker to an extraterritorial site of biopolitical exclusion.   
Governments also selectively use humanitarian rhetoric and policy to offset any 
perceived severity of securitization measures. That is, humanitarian policies accompany 
securitizing policies in ways that do not necessarily alleviate the impact of securitization but 
rather give the appearance of valuing human rights norms. Miriam Ticktin (2011) interrogates 
French immigration policies that allow undocumented migrants with life-threatening illnesses to 
obtain documentation while rejecting all others. According to Ticktin, the French discourse of 
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humanitarianism enables the government to provide care to a few at the expense of many, while 
appearing to outwardly maintain support for ostensibly humanitarian policies. Similarly, Little 
and Vaughan-Williams (2016) demonstrate the ways in which Australia uses the language of 
“compassion” in conjunction with restrictive border policies to quell potential opposition, 
arguing that allowing irregular migrants into Australia would promote human trafficking. The 
following questions that Fassin (2011) raises capture this tension between the use of 
humanitarian governance as a way to either protect human rights or circumvent more 
comprehensive, systemic changes to international migration: 
What, ultimately, is gained, and what lost, in the deal when we use the terms of 
suffering to speak of inequality, when we invoke trauma rather than recognizing 
violence, when we give residence rights to foreigners with health problems but 
restrict the conditions for political asylum, more generally when we mobilize 
compassion rather than justice? (p. 8). 
The use of humanitarian governance therefore not only seeks to offset potential public opposition 
to restrictive policies, but also does so by implicitly making biopolitical decisions of whose life 
matters and whose does not. 
         Finally, the use of crisis language by the media and political elites often represents 
migration as an unabated, overwhelming process that threatens the stability of the West. For 
example, Hungary’s far-right media has reinforced Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s portrayal of 
Muslim asylum seekers as fundamental threats to Hungary’s Christianity (Goździak, 2019); 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called African asylum seekers a “growing influx that 
threatens Israelis’ jobs and changes the character of the state” (Greenberg, 2011); and U.S. 
President Donald Trump has repeatedly criminalized both voluntary and forced migrants of color 
(Arce, 2019).  In the media, FOX News propagates anti-immigrant rhetoric, while both FOX 
News and CNN present people from the Middle East as irrational threats to democracy (Gil de 
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Zúñiga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012; Guzman, 2016). As Vaughan-Williams and Pisani (2018) 
argue: 
This securitized narrative has been reinforced by a powerful visual repertoire of 
radicalized and gendered representations of the geopolitics of the ‘crisis’ that 
emphasize unprecedented mass movement and play on the common theme of 
unruliness, invasion and besiegement. (p. 3). 
In reinforcing discourses of national security, the media intensifies public fear of immigrants, 
thereby “paving the way for xenophobic reactions, de-empowering the concerned populations, 
and de-politicizing” transnational displacement (Bettini, 2012, pp. 63-64). Therefore, the border 
system —and the states, economies, media, and other actors constructing it— inflict violence 
through border securitization, border externalization, and the mobilization of humanitarian and 
crisis language. 
Immigration Policy in the Trump Era 
Since his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump has tapped into existing sexism, 
racism, and ethno-nationalist discourses to rally supporters, whether by joking about sexual 
assault, demanding that four Congresswomen “go back home” —despite that the women to 
whom he referred are all American-born or naturalized citizens— or making other remarks that 
degrade women and people of color. Trump has made especially inflammatory remarks 
surrounding immigration, targeting immigrants generally and people from what he has termed 
“shithole countries.”2 Throughout his presidency, Trump has labeled immigrants —especially 
those from the Global South—  as “criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.,” “ISIS-affiliated,” and 
generally inferior to white Americans. In presenting immigrants as threats to American 
 
2 In a 2018 meeting with U.S. senators, Trump referred to Haiti, El Salvador, and some African nations as “shithole 
countries.” See Ibram X. Kendi’s article in The Guardian, “The Day Shithole Entered the Presidential Lexicon,” for 
an important discussion positioning Trump’s remarks within hierarchical global systems. 
12 
 
sovereignty and national security, Trump exploits a system of structural racism that is already 
pervasive in and underpins American society. 
Beyond rhetoric, Trump’s statements have been accompanied by restrictive policies that 
enact various forms of exclusion based on race, gender, religion, and sexuality. For example, 
Trump’s Executive Order 13769 (known colloquially as “the Muslim Ban”) initially barred 
migrants (including refugees) from the Muslim-majority countries of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, 
and Yemen, as well as from North Korea and Venezuela, and was expanded in 2020 to include 
people from Nigeria3, Myanmar, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Sudan, and Tanzania (Pierce and Selee, 
2017; Kanno-Youngs, 2020). The Migrant Protection Protocols —or “remain in Mexico”— 
policies and asylum cooperation agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador force 
asylum seekers from the U.S.-Mexico border into protracted vulnerability as they are required to 
remain in Mexico while they await asylum interviews (Rose, 2019). The same-sex partners of 
diplomats have been denied visas, pregnant women have been detained by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and perhaps most tellingly of the increasing hostility towards 
migrants, the U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) changed its mission statement to 
remove the phrase “nation of immigrants” (Pierce, 2019). 
Witnessing this rapid barrage of policies that have violent implications for human and 
nonhuman life, I have found myself, as a scholar-activist committed to mobility justice, 
struggling to both articulate the gravity of these policy trends and maintain hope and motivation 
for change. Between academic literature on borders that emphasizes violence while overlooking 
 
3 Tellingly, Nigerians are the most educated immigrants in the U.S., supporting the argument that the travel bans are 
not about a country’s socioeconomic status but rather about race.  
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hope, and bleak media reports of migrant deaths and abuses, it becomes difficult even to imagine 
a nonviolent border system. As one participant in my research told me, it often feels impossible 
to “balance the good with the bad” without becoming overwhelmed. How is it possible to frame 
the injustices —both witnessed and experienced— in ways that catalyze not just anger and 
hopelessness, but also subversion, opposition, and hope? How can those of us with access to the 
privileges of higher education, voting rights, proximity to policymakers, analysts, and decision 
makers use those spaces not just to oppose the violence engendered by borders, but also to 
recognize and honor agentive moments of hope and generation? This thesis thus reflects my own 
attempts to make sense of the violence that characterizes borders and the spaces they infuse, and 
to narrate the perspectives of those people who navigate these spaces, in ways that generate hope 
without dismissing violence.  
Borderscapes 
 I frame my argument within Chiara Brambilla’s (2015b) conceptualization of the 
borderscape, which draws on critical border studies and Appadurai’s five dimensions of global 
cultural flows.4 According to Brambilla, the borderscape is an analytical concept that accounts 
for the border’s ongoing construction, spatial and multi-scalar dispersal, and co-constitution with 
political subjectivity. Brambilla argues that the borderscape: 
Offers us an opportunity to adopt a multi-sited approach not only combining 
different places where borderscapes could be observed and experienced —both in 
borderlands and wherever specific bordering processes have impacts, are 
represented, negotiated or displaced – but also different socio-cultural, political, 
economic as well as legal and historical settings where a space of negotiating 
actors, practices, and discourses is articulated. (p. 22). 
 
4 Ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes (Appadurai, 1996). 
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The borderscape concept presents the border as an iterative process situated within the many 
interacting contexts of globalization. The -scape suffix therefore serves two purposes: first, to 
emphasize the dispersed contours of bordering processes (i.e., the noun form of -scape as in 
landscape) and, second, to center the actors interacting with those processes (i.e., -scape as a 
verb meaning to shape or mold). As a concept, the borderscape provides necessary analytical 
flexibility for interpreting the physical, symbolic, discursive, and other manifestations of borders 
and bordering processes.  
I also use the concept of intersectionality throughout the thesis, particularly as it applies to 
women of color. Building on her previous work that investigated ways in which protective legal 
frameworks overlook women of color, Crenshaw (1990) defines structural intersectionality 
against women of color as “the ways in which the location of women of color at the intersection 
of race and gender” informed lived experiences. Intersectionality refers to the multiplicity of 
identities as well as social relations and structures of power (Crenshaw, 1990; Anthias, 2012; 
Hopkins, 2019). Intersectionality is also implicit within the borderscapes concept as it locates 
specific positions in which injustice occurs as well as sites of struggle or contestation. 
In the context of human mobility generally and migration into the U.S. specifically, an 
intersectional lens is necessary to understand the convergence of structural violences on women 
of color. Because women often shoulder the role of intergenerational knowledge-sharing, they 
disproportionately bear the brunt of maintaining that knowledge in new contexts (Anthias, 2012). 
In societies such as the U.S. in which xenophobia and racism are rampant, transmitting ethnic, 
national, or cultural knowledge may be particularly difficult or risky as it signals Otherness in 
inhospitable surroundings. Furthermore, the female body often becomes a vehicle for enacting 
racist “nation-building” prerogatives (Mollett and Faria, 2013). Nonetheless, sites of 
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intersectional exclusion can also generate resistance, solidarity, and other forms of agency. 
Finally, adopting an intersectional framework is critical to scholarship on migration, as it 
requires ongoing engagement with dynamic structures of power and inequality. As a white 
woman conducting research on fundamentally race- and gender-based policies, this project has 
required me to constantly engage with questions of intersectionality, privilege, and “situated 
knowledges,” which has in turn informed my analysis and presentation of gender and racial 
exclusion (Haraway, 1988). 
Research Methods 
I use primarily qualitative methods in this thesis, which I supplement with analyses of 
State Department statistics. The paper begins with an analysis of the January 2020 birth tourism 
regulation, which denies B visas to applicants expressing their sole purpose of travel to be giving 
birth and obtaining American citizenship for the child. I position the policy within exclusionary 
American immigration policies dating back to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1882 
Immigration Act, and the racialized and gendered policies that both acts preceded. I adapt U.S. 
State Department statistics of B Visa grantees’ country of origin and analyze the U.S. Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) to demonstrate the racial and geopolitical underpinnings of the 
regulation. 
Beginning from the perspective that public policy emerges from dynamic discursive 
contexts, I also analyze political discourse surrounding the regulation, including Trump’s 
campaign and presidential promises to overturn the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause, the 
gendered underpinnings of the regulation, and the emergence of sensationalized media accounts 
of “maternity hotels.” This involves linking the regulation’s anticipated impacts, which are 
symbolic rather than practical, to the history of the 14th Amendment and recent opposition to it, 
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news outlets’ treatment of non-resident mothers giving birth in the U.S., and the relationship 
between state sovereignty and the female body. This chapter primarily uses existing research and 
secondary news sources. In tracing the historical precedents, media coverage of birth tourism, 
and anticipated outcomes of the birth tourism regulation, I also identify its continuities with 
structural violence that has been part of the American immigration system since 1882. I therefore 
present the current administration’s use of immigration policy as a way to pursue racist, 
gendered geopolitical prerogatives with deep historic roots. 
In Chapter Three, I draw on  qualitative interviews conducted during fall 2019, when I 
began volunteering as an English as a Second Language (ESL) instructor’s assistant at nonprofit 
Spero Project nonprofit in Oklahoma City (OKC), which works primarily with resettling 
refugees. Throughout the fall months, I joined the weekly advanced-level class composed of the 
instructor, seven women from Myanmar, and one woman from Ecuador. Occasionally, one of the 
women would be accompanied by her husband. In addition to building relationships with class 
participants, I used this time to introduce my research project and solicit participants. While all 
of the class participants kindly offered to participate in individual interviews at a later date, their 
time was extremely limited: as full-time working mothers, their daily obligations included not 
only children and employment, but also homemaking, community outreach, religious 
involvement, language learning, and preparation for citizenship exams. As such, only two 
women were willing and able to share their time in an interview, and I interviewed each woman 
three times for approximately one hour per interview. 
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The first two interviews with Myint5, a sixty-four-year-old Burmese woman, took place 
in the ESL classroom, while the last one took place at her home nearby. The first and third 
interviews with Su, a twenty-six-year-old Burmese woman, took place in the ESL classroom, 
while the second took place in a local coffee shop. All interviews were held at participants’ 
location of choice to ensure that they were as comfortable and in control as possible. These 
interviews were semi-structured and consisted of questions regarding participants’ experiences in 
their country of origin (in both cases, Myanmar), any transit countries/states they traveled 
through, and their life following resettlement in Oklahoma City. The questions were designed to 
elicit memories and imaginaries of the various geographical, social, legal, and other spaces 
through which participants moved. For example, participants were asked to describe any sounds, 
smells, or images that they associated with “home,” and to describe those associations. Similarly, 
participants were asked about ongoing relationships with different spaces, including in the 
country of origin, transit spaces, and across the U.S. I also asked participants about their 
experiences in Oklahoma City, allowing the conversation to traverse experiences of comfort, 
anxiety, eagerness, nostalgia, and other emotional landscapes. 
While not intentional, these conversations elicited stories of violence and trauma in those 
situations, and I offered the opportunity to stop the interview or to shift to a different 
conversation if the participant felt more comfortable doing so. However, in each instance, the 
participants stated that it was important to them to share that part of their experience, and neither 
became visibly distraught. Furthermore, while participants shared examples of instances that I 
would categorize as “violent” (as discussed in Chapter Three), those instances were not retold as 
laden with the visible emotional upset that I expected; in terms of positionality, this was a 
 
5 Note that all names used in this thesis are pseudonyms. 
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valuable reminder that these participants may not feel comfortable or obliged to share their 
emotional experiences with me, nor should I assume that every violent encounter induces 
emotional distress and, lastly, that my own understanding of what distress looks like may not 
detect cultural or emotional differences in expression. 
During these interviews, I followed Dunn’s model of the researcher as “interventionist,” 
meaning that I entered the interview with general questions and topics to discuss, but followed 
the participant’s lead in directing conversation, intervening/redirecting only when necessary 
(cited in Hay, 2010, pp. 110-112). After each interview, I wrote down field notes, thoughts, and 
follow-up questions that I used to inform subsequent interviews before transcribing each 
interview. Because participants steered conversation in ways meaningful to them, the resulting 
interviews provide rich, complex, and often unexpected perspectives despite their relative 
brevity.  
By centering the perspectives of women who have lived the experience of resettling from 
Myanmar to the U.S., I am able to extend the analysis of structural violence in the migration 
process both geographically —through parts of Myanmar, Malaysia, and the U.S.— and 
temporally —from British colonization through Su’s and Myint’s imagined futures. This 
demonstrates the ongoing impact that forced migration has on these women’s lives as well as the 
historic inequalities that led to their displacement. Furthermore, because the interviews prompted 
stories of struggles and triumphs alike, they enabled me to link experiences of hardship and hope 
with structural violence and agency. Alongside an analysis of the 2020 birth tourism regulation, 
my interviews with Myint and Su enable me to trace “the migration process” beyond movement 
alone to identify political, social, temporal, and geographic contexts that converge to inform 
experiences of transnational movement within immigration policy. 
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Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows: in Chapter Two, I analyze the 2020 birth tourism 
regulation within the geopolitical contexts of U.S.-China, U.S.-India, and U.S.-Brazil 
relationships and the use of reproduction restrictions to enact national sovereignty. I argue that 
the 2020 regulation builds on legal precedents of race- and gender-based exclusion and signals 
disregard for lives at the intersections of certain nationalities, races, and genders. In using 
immigration policy as a geopolitical tool without regard for the violence it produces, the Trump 
administration continues an ethnonationalist approach to American sovereignty. In this chapter, I 
focus especially on the political and economic motivations for the birth tourism regulation, using 
Brambilla’s (2015b) borderscapes concept the birth tourism regulation as a reproduction and 
advancement of existing bordering practices.  
In Chapter Three, I discuss participants’ experiences with migration-violence 
intersections. Although structural violence receives substantial attention in this chapter, I also 
pay close attention to the acute moments of violence it incurs. This enables me to ground 
structural violence in embodied experiences. My goal here is not to sensationalize violence, but 
instead to stay true to participants’ intimate understandings of their own experiences. Here, I 
focus particularly on the act of scaping the border, or the various ways in which actors engage 
with bordering processes. As such, I devote a substantial portion of this chapter to disentangling 
agencies and subjectivities that are in constant tension with the structural violence of bordering 
processes. This focus on structure and agency reflects my desire to bring to light reservoirs of 
resistance, solidarity, and other meaningful connections that characterize processes of “belonging 




Chapter Two. Re/Producing Exclusion: Legal and Discursive Precedents of the 2020 Birth 
Tourism Regulation 
The U.S. Visitor Visa, or B visa, facilitates non-immigrant visits by allowing foreign 
nationals to enter the U.S. for up to ninety days for tourism or business.6 In January 2020, the 
Federal Register published an amendment to B visa policies in the United States (U.S. 
Department of State, 2020). The amendment empowers consular officers abroad to deny a B visa 
for business or pleasure to any person suspected of travelling to the U.S. for the sole purpose of 
giving birth and obtaining American citizenship for their child. Although analysts anticipate that 
the regulation will be difficult to enforce, it nonetheless reflects a disturbing national discourse 
of race-based exclusion and surveillance of the female body (NPR, 2020; Lee and Long, 2020). 
This discourse values whiteness over the lives of people of color, demographic control over 
reproductive rights, and elite state prerogatives over human rights. In this chapter, I position the 
birth tourism regulation within the context of past immigration policy to demonstrate the legal 
and discursive precedents upon which the regulation draws, arguing that the policy is rooted in 
the intersectional violence of racism and reproductive injustice which have been used to assert 
American sovereignty in the past.  
The Birth Tourism Regulation 
The birth tourism rule empowers consular officers to deny B visas to “any person whom 
the consular officer has reason to believe is traveling for the primary purpose of giving birth in the 
 
6 The State Department lists business activities such as attending conferences or consulting with business activities, 
and tourism activities such as vacation/holiday, medical treatment, and non-paid participation in amateur sports and 
music (note that this is not a comprehensive list). 
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United States to obtain U.S. citizenship for their child” (U.S. Department of State, 2020). The 
central tenets to the rule as published in the Federal Register are as follows: 
1.   The rule requires consular officers to deny B Visas to persons whose explicit 
purpose of obtaining a visa is to give birth in the U.S. in order to secure birthright 
citizenship for their child. Consular officers are not required to ask all women 
whether they are pregnant, but rather rely on visual cues to determine whether an 
applicant is pregnant.7 
2.   The rule establishes the rebuttable presumption that a pregnant applicant is 
pursuing a visa for the sole purpose of attaining birthright citizenship. This means 
that, if a consular officer suspects that an applicant is pregnant, the applicant is 
responsible for providing evidence to the contrary, thereby placing the burden of 
explication on the applicant themselves. 
3.   If an applicant’s primary purpose of application is to secure healthcare access 
(whether maternity-related or otherwise), the applicant must demonstrate that 
healthcare is inaccessible in or near to their country of origin and that the applicant 
demonstrates the financial capacity to undergo medical treatment. Furthermore, the 
applicant must provide a documented agreement with a U.S. medical provider to 
undergo treatment. 
4.   The B Visa, which permits business- or pleasure-related travel to the U.S. for up 
to 90 days, is not required for residents of 39 countries with whom the U.S. has a Visa 
 
7 Under the regulation, consular officers are required to ask whether a person is pregnant only if there is a reason to 
believe they are pregnant (such as visible pregnancy). 
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Waiver Program (VWP) agreement. These countries, listed in Table 1, are 
predominantly Western and almost entirely European (U.S. Department of State, 
n.d.). 
Figure 2 
Countries Included in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP)8. 
 
Birthright Citizenship and the Politics of Birth 
         The 14th Amendment establishes jus soli citizenship, which guarantees birthright 
citizenship to any person born on U.S. soil. The 14th Amendment is both enshrined in the 
Constitution and entangled within the U.S. history of slavery and civil war: as part of the post-
Civil War reconstruction efforts, the 1868 Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment sought to 
 
8 Andorra, France, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Australia, Germany, Lithuania, Singapore, Austria, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, Belgium, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia, Brunei, Iceland, Monaco, Spain, Chile, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Taiwan, Estonia, 
South Korea, Poland, Finland, Latvia, Portugal. 
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ensure that newly emancipated former slaves received American citizenship.9 Birthright 
citizenship is also protected in thirty-five other countries, including Canada, Fiji, and much of 
Central America (World Population Review, 2020). However, the citizenship clause of the 14th 
Amendment is not universally supported; in 2010, for example, Senator Lindsey Graham 
proposed amending the Constitution to end birthright citizenship, stating: 
I may introduce a constitutional amendment that changes the rules if you have a 
child here. Birthright citizenship, I think, is a mistake, that we should change our 
Constitution… people come here to have babies. They come here to drop a child. 
It’s called ‘drop and leave.’ To have a child in America, they cross the border, 
have a child, and that child’s automatically an American citizen. That shouldn’t 
be the case. That attracts people here for all the wrong reasons. (PolitiFact, qtd. in 
Gouliamos and Kassimeris, 2013, p. 18). 
As far back as 1995, the House Judiciary Committee introduced the “Citizenship Reform Act of 
1995,” which if passed would have ended the constitutional right to birthright citizenship for 
children of nonresidents (H.R. 1363, 1995). More recently political figures such as Senator 
Mitch McConnell deplore the clause’s alleged abuse of American taxpayers (Preston, 2010). 
President Trump has repeatedly used the abolition of birthright citizenship as a way to garner 
support for exclusionary policies and practice. For example, during his presidential campaign in 
2015, Trump stated that “we have to start a process where we take back our country” by ending 
birthright citizenship (Diamond, 2015). Right before the 2018 midterm elections, Trump 
revamped his call to end birthright citizenship, threatening to do so with an executive order 
(Davis, 2018); and in August 2019, Trump called birthright citizenship “a magnet for illegal 
immigration” (Lyons, 2019). These opponents of birthright citizenship detach the citizenship 
 
9 The Citizenship Clause has also notably been denied to Native Americans and African Americans at times 
throughout history (Chavez, 2017). 
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clause from its roots in the 14th Amendment and slavery abolition, instead presenting it as an 
unfair way for foreigners to obtain American citizenship.  
The birth tourism regulation therefore represents the Trump administration’s attempt to 
deliver on campaign promises to overturn the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Legal scholars, however, have repeatedly reiterated the implausibility of eliminating birthright 
citizenship as a constitutional right: because the 14th Amendment is constitutionally protected 
and rooted in violent histories of racism, its repeal would likely be a lengthy and divisive process 
(Everett and Oprysko, 2018; Jacobson, 2018; Hesson, 2018). With the amendment’s repeal 
unlikely, the birth tourism regulation effectively seeks to circumvent rather than overturn the 14th 
Amendment. However, by using visual cues to trigger a process that determines a woman’s 
ability to obtain a visa, the birth tourism regulation increases the U.S. government’s surveillance 
of the foreign female body.  
         The birth tourism regulation also draws on recent discussions surrounding “maternity 
hotels”: rented rooms advertised to foreign nationals wishing to give birth in the U.S. These 
accounts of “maternity hotels” have proliferated in recent years: in 2013, NPR covered the 
frustration of neighborhood residents in Chino Hills, California where a subdivided mansion was 
rented out primarily to expectant Chinese mothers (NPR, 2013); in 2015, California police raided 
a similar building in Irvine as part of a scheme uncovering three competing “maternity hotel” 
operations (Seida, 2015); and a 2019 report by USA Today profiled a Florida-based agency that 
arranges care for expecting Russian women to travel to the U.S. to give birth (Stashevska, 2019). 
These accounts demonstrate that there are cases of birth tourism and even “maternity hotels;” 
however, these accounts rely on the unfounded problematization of birthright citizenship.  
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         Ostensibly, the birth tourism regulation seeks to prevent large-scale birthright citizenship 
and the presence of “maternity hotels.” However, the rule does not actually facilitate the 
regulation of maternity hotels as it applies only to individuals applying for visas. Furthermore, 
women interviewed in the media cases above stated that their visa applications included 
fraudulent statements about their purpose for travel (NPR, 2013; Seida, 2015). This is because, 
even before the birth tourism regulation, consular officers were unlikely to issue a visa for 
someone who states that their sole purpose of travel is to give birth. Agencies that facilitate 
women’s stay in “maternity hotels” often provide coaching on how to convince consular officials 
that the purpose of their visit is not to give birth (Blankstein, Schecter, and Connor, 2015). While 
committing and encouraging visa fraud are both illegal, the practice of soliciting customers and 
providing pregnancy-related services (room and board, transportation to doctor’s appointments 
and scheduling assistance, etc.) is not. Furthermore, according to women who have used these 
services, the entire process can cost between $20,000 and $80,000 (Stashevska, 2019; Jordan, 
2019). Because this practice is so lucrative for these agencies and because customers often 
commit visa fraud to circumvent consular officers’ suspicion, the likelihood that the regulation 
will prevent similar fraud from continuing seems slim.10 
         The federal government also does not collect data on the number of “birthright citizens” 
born annually. The Center for Disease Control estimates that approximately 9,300 children with 
at least one nonpermanent resident parent are born annually in the United States; this statistic 
does not, however, disaggregate by visa status or nationality (Hesson, 2020). Others, such as that 
of the anti-immigration think tank Center for Immigration Studies, estimate the number of 
 
10 It is also worth noting that the U.S. does not keep data on the reasons for which B visa-holders enter the country, 
nor on the number of children born annually to nonresident parents who subsequently leave the country 
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birthright citizens born annually in the U.S. to be closer to 20,00011 (Camarota, 2020). 
Furthermore, the rule’s architects have yet to fully explicate the rule’s procedural ambiguities. 
For example, a successful B visa application is valid for ten years; under the new rule, a consular 
officer could conceivably deny a visa to an applicant who is not pregnant, if that applicant is 
unable to affirm another primary purpose for travel. On the flip side, a successful visa applicant 
might become pregnant, travel to the U.S., and obtain birthright citizenship for their child any 
time within the visa’s ten-year validity. All other arguments aside, the rule creates a temporal 
and legal “gray zone” that may either circumvent the law’s application (as in the case of a person 
who becomes pregnant) or prevent people of “child-bearing age” from travel to the U.S. at all (as 
in the case of a person who may become pregnant).  
         What, then, is the impetus for the birth tourism regulation, given that it lacks foundations 
in empirical data and relies on the dubious assumption that consular officers can detect visa fraud 
from applicants who are themselves trained by businesspeople with serious financial stakes in 
their success? The U.S. has historically asserted its sovereignty by mobilizing nationalism 
through restrictive immigration policy and practice (Agnew, 2008). The birth tourism regulation 
is therefore an extension of that history. I follow Wang (2017) who argues that citizens’ 
perceptions of “maternity hotels” are contemporary manifestations of historic racial exclusion: 
Political arguments ostensibly about the present must always rely on a (re)telling 
of the past and a vision of the future. Said differently, temporality itself is 
constitutive of politics in the present, and it is precisely the collapsing of the past 
and the future that distinguishes the contemporary mode of biopolitics. (p. 2). 
 
11 Note that this think tank previously released estimates of up to 36,000 American citizens born to non-resident 
parents, but revised their methodologies following criticism from other analysts. 
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Within this context of collapsing past and future into a singular political argument, the birth 
tourism regulation draws upon economic, social, and geopolitical tensions to produce the foreign 
fetus as an inherent threat to national security. 
The Page Law (1875) and the Advent of Gatekeeping 
Exclusionary immigration laws draw on social attitudes about who belongs and who does 
not (Wang, 2017; Molina, 2014). The 1875 Page Law was the first federal immigration law that 
explicitly restricted a group of people from entering the U.S. (Page Law, 1875). In response to 
fears (likely fueled by xenophobia) that Chinese women were disproportionately employed as 
prostitutes, the Page Law banned Chinese women suspected of being prostitutes from entering 
the U.S. (Peffer, 1986). According to Peffer (1986), the Page Law skewed the proportion of 
Chinese women to men for nearly a century because, although the law targeted Chinese 
prostitutes specifically, the consular officials in charge of enforcing the law used it to restrict 
Chinese women generally.12 The Page Law therefore created long-lasting demographic effects 
by barring Chinese women access to the U.S. while Chinese men were, at least for a time, still 
permitted. Finally, the Page Law also set a precedent for excluding women from immigration, 
and the 1903 Immigration Act (also known as the Anarchist Exclusion Act) extended the ban on 
the entry of potential prostitutes to all nationalities (Immigration Act, 1903). 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
 
12 See also: Peffer, G. A. (1992). From under the Sojourner's Shadow: A Historiographical Study of Chinese Female 
Immigration to America, 1852-1882. Journal of American Ethnic History, 41-67 and Murphy, E. L. (2005). 
“Prelude to Imperialism” 1: Whiteness and Chinese Exclusion in the Reimagining of the United States. Journal of 
Historical Sociology, 18(4), 457-490. 
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In 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act (CEA) joined the 1875 Page Law in barring all 
Chinese nationals from entering the United States (CEA, 1882). As its name implies, the CEA 
barred the entry of Chinese nationals into the U.S. for ten years and was renewed by the Geary 
Act of 1892. In addition to introducing specifically nationality-based restrictions into U.S. federal 
immigration law in what has been referred to as a “watershed moment” in U.S. immigration 
history, the CEA contributed to a system of racial categorization by establishing Chinese 
immigrants “as the models by which to measure the desirability (and ‘whiteness’) of other 
immigrant groups” (Lee, 2002, p. 37; Murphy, 2005). The CEA also had a socioeconomic 
component, as a substantial portion of agricultural and railroad jobs were held by Chinese 
workers (Zhu, 2013). The discriminatory policy was therefore legitimized by presenting Chinese 
men as threats to American livelihoods. 
According to Lee, the CEA was also rooted in —and then codified— the language of 
“gatekeeping,” which relies on racializing immigrants, containing the perceived danger of 
immigrants, and protecting the American nation from that racialized threat (2002, p. 38). The key 
premise of “gatekeeping” is territorial exclusion whereby racialized bodies can be filtered before 
entering the U.S. to separate desirable from undesirable immigrants (Lee, 2002). Often referred 
to as a “watershed” moment in American immigration policy, the law laid the foundations for 
race- and class-based restrictions on immigration. Examples of these include the 1892 Geary 
Act, which extended the Chinese Exclusion Act to 1902; the 1917 Immigration Act, which barred 
immigration from the Asia-Pacific region and introduced literacy tests into immigration 
admissions; the 2001 Patriot Act, which increased surveillance of foreign students and broadened 
the grounds of terrorism; the 2002 Homeland Security Act which constructed the Department of 
Homeland Security which, in 2003, included CBP, ICE, and USCIS; the 2006 Secure Fence Act, 
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which funded the extension of border walls along the U.S.-Mexico border; and the 2017 travel 
ban and its subsequent iterations, which deny people from thirteen countries entrance into the 
U.S.  
Immigration Act of 1882 
In addition to creating a federal head tax on immigration, the Immigration Act of 1882 
established the public charge principle enabling the immediate refusal of entry to anyone deemed 
a “convict, lunatic, idiot, or person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a 
public charge” (Immigration Act, 1882). The public charge principle joined local and state 
practices of denying entry to anyone likely to be a public charge; however, the 1882 law itself 
provided no definition of what constitutes a “public charge” (USCIS, updated 2019). The lack of 
a clear definition enabled immigration officials to deny migrants entry on an ad hoc basis, 
resulting in disproportionate impacts on women, Jews, and other racial or ethnic minorities at 
various times throughout U.S. history (Moloney, 2012). The public charge principle also set a 
legal precedent for future exclusionary laws including the 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act, which drastically reduced immigrants’ eligibility for public assistance 
programs (Singer, 2004), and the 2020 iteration of the public charge rule, which grants 
immigration officials the authority to deny admission or status adjustment to applicants who 
might use, or who have already used, social welfare benefits (Capps, Gelatt, and Greenberg, 
2020). 
These policies and others form the exclusionary foundations upon which the 2020 birth 
tourism regulation is built. The xenophobic racialization of Chinese immigrants formed social 
perceptions of Chinese women as prostitutes, which became the justification for the exclusion of 
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Chinese women from entering the U.S. Furthermore, the Page Law was later expanded to all 
immigrant women suspected of being prostitutes, making gender into an excludable category in 
immigration law. Finally, the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act created categories of admissible and 
inadmissible migrants based on racializing a migrant’s country of origin. Together, these laws 
laid the foundations for a racialized American immigration system enacted through the female 
body.  
Enacting Exclusion Via the Birth Tourism Regulation 
         The 2020 birth tourism regulation makes use of these precedents by treating the female 
body as a site upon which to assert state sovereignty and nationalist prerogatives. Furthermore, 
the regulation impacts visitors differentially depending on what country they are from. The table 
below shows the nationalities that received the most B visas annually from 2011 through 2018: 
Figure 3 
Countries Receiving the Most B Visas Annually, 2011-2018.13 
 




Source: My analysis of U.S. Department of State Nonimmigrant Visa Statistics, 2011-2018, 
available from https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/visa-law0/visa-
statistics/nonimmigrant-visa-statistics.html.  
In seven of the nine years included in these tables, applicants from China received the highest 
number of B visas for the year, with Brazil and Japan filling the top spot in the remaining two 
years. In every year except for 2013 and 2018, India and Brazil each received either the second 
or third most B visas. The South American countries of Argentina and Colombia were each in 
the top five most B visas received for every year except 2018. Because people from these 
countries receive the most B visas annually, it follows that there will be more people from these 
countries impacted by the regulation than from countries receiving fewer B visas.  
         According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) site, which updates global 
demographic data weekly based on national statistics, the ethnic majorities in China, India, 
Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia are Han Chinese (91.6%), Indo-Aryan (72%), white (47.7%) 
and mulatto (mixed white and black, 43.1%), European and mestizo (97.2%), and mestizo and 
white (87.6%), respectively (CIA, 2020). Of course, these categorizations are problematic in 
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their own right but, for the purpose of my argument which presents the birth tourism regulation 
as a symbolic or discursive enactment of the border, I focus on the dominant American 
perception of race in each of these countries.14 Under the birth tourism regulation, women from 
these countries applying for B visas will be disproportionately impacted by consular officers’ 
scrutiny of their reproductive status. To revisit Wang’s (2017) assertation that “the present must 
always rely on a (re)telling of the past and a vision of the future” (p. 2), the birth tourism 
regulation does this by using the familiar exclusion of the “Other” and anti-birthright citizenship 
rhetoric to present a future white imaginary. 
 The regulation also responds to geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China, Brazil, 
Colombia, India, and Argentina. Notably, three of the five countries are part of BRICS, the 
multilateral group of emerging economies including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa. The BRICS countries together comprise over 40% of the global human population; the 
top three countries receiving B visas for tourism annually, Brazil, India, and China, alone 
comprise nearly 39% of the global human population (Worldometer, 2020). As emerging 
economies with large populations, the BRICS countries are often presented as competition to the 
West and existing world order (Li and Marsh, 2016); in its attempt to regulate these countries’ 
access to American citizenship via the birth tourism regulation, the U.S. responds to that 
perceived competition.  
Finally, the birth tourism regulation specifically uses the female body to enforce nativist 
policy by seeking to prevent nonresident women from giving birth on American soil. According 
to proponents of the birth tourism regulation, nonresidents’ American-born children pose 
 
14 Acknowledging the limitations of race/ethnicity categories used by American immigration policy, I use these 
terms without endorsing them. 
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security threats to the American nation: the Department of State’s summary of the rule states that 
“Foreign governments or entities, including entities of concern to the United States, may seek to 
benefit from birth tourism for purposes that would threaten the security of the United States,” 
citing fears that children born in the U.S. but raised elsewhere might use their American 
citizenship to sabotage American interests later in life (U.S. Department of State, 2020). In a 
statement, White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham stated that "Closing this glaring 
immigration loophole will combat these endemic abuses and ultimately protect the United States 
from the national security risks created by [birth tourism]” while also protecting “the integrity of 
American citizenship” (BBC, 2020). 
In tapping into the discourse of “national security,” actors inflame “the perception of the 
Other as an attempt on [one’s] life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger,” which characterizes 
the contemporary sovereign (Mbembe, 2003, p. 18). In this conceptualization, the Other need not 
actually threaten a sovereign; rather, the perception that an Other both exists and is dangerous 
legitimizes violence against that Other. As the birth tourism regulation demonstrates, the Other 
must not necessarily even exist to threaten the imaginary of the American sovereign. Instead, the 
potential existence of an Other (the unborn child of a non-American parent) is presented as 
sufficiently threatening to justify exclusion. Especially because India, China, and Brazil are part 
of BRICS, which the West perceives as antagonistic competition, the regulation’s use of security 
language reflects geopolitical tensions that rely on presenting potential competition as existential 
threats to national sovereignty.  
Because it is the “carrier” of this perceived threat, it is the female body that the state 
targets to remove that threat. The practice of controlling the female body in order to reinforce 
national sovereignty and state authority is not new; indeed, as Smith and Vesudevan (2017) 
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argue, the concept of birthright citizenship itself is “crucial to producing racialized national 
futures through the legal and regulatory manipulation of women’s reproductive capacities” (p. 
214). Drawing on scholarship tracing the links between nationalist projects and kinship to 
discuss the role of women in reproducing the state, Yuval-Davis (2004) argues that women are 
often expected to transmit cultural knowledge and values intergenerationally; as such, “a major 
part of the control of women as national reproducers relate to her actual biological role as bearer 
of children” (p. 26). Similarly, Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2009) discusses the Israeli state’s use of the 
Palestinian female body to control national demography: according to Shalhoub-Kevorkian, the 
Israeli state regulates Palestinian women’s ability to access healthcare in Jerusalem in order to 
prevent their children’s documentation and to maintain an Jewish majority population. The 
Israeli state’s “geopolitical, biopolitical and necropolitical policies are ultimately tied to Israel’s 
maintenance of sovereignty,” and the female body is the mechanism through which control is 
exercised (p. 1197). By excluding the offspring of women (of color, from the Global South) from 
accessing American citizenship, the birth tourism regulation also reinforces the link between 
women and state sovereignty. That is, the female body becomes a site for upon which the state 
enacts its borders, while the discourse of national security aims to legitimate exclusionary 
prerogatives. 
Because the 2020 birth tourism regulation applies only to the reproductive female body 
from specific countries, it applies specifically at the intersection of nationality and sex. Like 
many policies throughout U.S. history, the regulation aims to exclude “undesirable” immigrants 
by targeting visa applicants from predominantly non-Western countries such as China, Russia, 
and India. However, like the Page Act of 1875, the law enforces this exclusion through the 
female body. In doing so, the regulation treats women from specific countries as threats to 
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national sovereignty and security because of their capacity to reproduce American citizens whose 
parentage confounds white, ethnonationalist imaginaries. 
Implications and Conclusions 
         As I have shown in this chapter, the birth tourism regulation operates at an individual 
level and will likely have an insignificant practical impact on a larger scale. However, the 
symbolic implications are profound and, combined with the lack of data on the prevalence of 
“birth tourism,” raise several key questions: how will consular officers respond to being tasked 
with adjudicating a person’s reproductive status? Will consular officers act discriminatorily, 
denying visas without proof (or even well-founded suspicion) of pregnancy? Will international 
audiences perceive the rule as an indicator that they are unwelcome in the U.S., thereby either 
making people hesitant to even apply for a visa or provoking other states to retaliate with 
similarly exclusionary measures? Perhaps most importantly for the democratic rule of law, does 
the birth tourism regulation mark an accelerating erosion of the 14th Amendment and birthright 
citizenship in the United States?  
Although these questions are yet to be answered, the historical precedents upon which the 
regulation draws may offer guidance. As Peffer’s (1986) groundbreaking work demonstrates, the 
Page Law’s exclusion of some Chinese women was, in practice, extended to most Chinese 
women both through consular officers’ biased adjudication and women’s subsequent reluctance 
to even apply for entry. As I have shown in this chapter, the 2020 birth tourism regulation uses a 
racialized discourse of national security to justify differential exclusion. In restricting mobility 
access in a way determined by the intersections of sex and nationality, the birth tourism 
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regulation surveils reproduction of certain women to pursue American geopolitical interests and 




Chapter Three. Moving From, Through and Into the Structural Violence of Forced 
Migration: Myint and Su 
Post-2016 immigration policy in the U.S. has dealt significant blows against immigration 
generally, with both birthright citizenship and refugee resettlement impacted by restrictions. 
Whereas Chapter Two focused on tracing key historical moments in American immigration 
policy that enable racialized and gendered exclusion in the 2020 birth tourism regulation, this 
chapter shifts to interrogate structural violence that occurs throughout the forced migration 
process. Although the birth tourism regulation does not apply specifically to forced migration, its 
racial and gendered underpinnings are not unique and, as I discuss in this chapter, also inform the 
experiences of refugees who have made it to the U.S. Drawing  on interviews with women with 
firsthand experience of resettling in the U.S., this chapter focuses specifically on the ways in 
which participants experience and interact with structural violence in migration. 
In this chapter, I treat forced migration as a temporally and geographically extensive 
process that continues long past a person’s arrival in a safe country. As I was interviewing the 
participants whose stories constitute the focus of this chapter, whom I call Myint and Su, about 
their experiences with migration, their narratives oscillated between past, present, and future and 
across oceans of space: both women linked their friendships in the U.S. with memories of 
childhood in Myanmar, and infused their daily lives in Oklahoma City with hopes that their 
children’s futures would include quality education that they, their parents, and grandparents had 
not received.  They both also embedded their accounts of their own displacement within a much 
broader geopolitical context of Myanmar’s colonial, military, and religious histories. Narrating 
one’s life experiences is itself an act of linking time, space, and experience. Myint and Su used 
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those links in ways that were not only descriptive of their experiences but that also highlighted 
their individual agency throughout the migration process. 
This chapter also responds to Brambilla’s (2015a and 2015b) call to investigate 
alternative political agencies and subjectivities engendered by spatial, social, and political 
bordering. According to Brambilla (2015a and 2015b), the borderscape is not only an exercise of 
power in space, but also a site where struggles against that power can emerge. Similarly, 
Brambilla and Jones (2019) argue that, as a de-territorialized and processual space, the 
borderscape can also be viewed as a common good; that is, even while borders represent power, 
domination, and exclusion, the liminal spaces that comprise borderlands and borderscapes are 
necessarily inhabited by the subjects of that power, domination, and exclusion and, as a 
collectively inhabited space, might also become a space of collective opposition. As a site of 
ongoing conflict in which opposition to the violence of borders might emerge, the borderscape 
provides an opportunity to deepen understanding of agency and subjectivity. In this chapter, I 
trace the borders that informed the lives and narratives of Myint and Su, from the national 
borders that they crossed to the linguistic barriers between family members constructed by that 
crossing. In identifying the structural violence that the border enacts alongside the agentive 
responses it elicits, I emphasize the possibilities for generation and solidarity that make the 
borderscape a site of “belonging and becoming” (Brambilla, 2015b, p. 30). This allows me to not 
only identify specific ways in which Myint and Su assert agency in the context of structural 
violence, but also exhibits the relationality of structural violence and agency (Brunet-Jailly, 
2005).  
Situating the Voices of Participants in Oklahoma City 
39 
 
Myint is a sixty-four-year-old woman from Kachin State Myanmar, who moved to the 
United States with her husband in 2017. I met Myint in an advanced ESL class, where she was 
the first person to express interest in participating in my thesis project. The Burmese children in 
Myint’s neighborhood call her moji, or grandmother, and she never misses an opportunity to 
share videos of her one-year-old granddaughter (whom she has never met). Myint is quick with a 
joke and has a remarkable affinity for sharing both joy and grief in the same breath. Although 
she is relatively new to OKC and Spero Project activities, Myint has already established a strong 
network of friends, mentees, and supports by hosting events in her home, frequenting the Spero 
Project classroom, and bringing both candor and kindness to interpersonal exchanges. 
Importantly, Myint lived through turbulent and pivotal years in Burmese history including the 
1962 coup d’état, transitions to and from socialism, restrictive citizenship policies, economic 
recession, anti-government riots, the transition to quasi-democracy, numerous leadership and 
constitutional changes, increasing presence of exploitative Chinese firms, and surges of military 
and interethnic violence. Myint therefore has extensive knowledge of the history that culminated 
in her move to the U.S., and that continues to inform her life today. 
Su is a twenty-six-year-old woman who has lived in OKC with her parents and siblings 
for ten years. Originally from Chin State in Myanmar, Su lived undocumented for one year in a 
Malaysian refugee community before she and her family were resettled in the U.S. For the last 
several years, Su has worked as the after-school Program Officer at the Spero Project, where one 
of her primary contributions is serving as a link between Burmese youth and their parents who 
often have limited experience navigating American systems and the English language. Su’s 
language skills are themselves a constant marvel: not only does she speak at least four languages 
fluently, but she also uses those languages to bridge communities, connect family members 
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across generations, and soothe feelings of disorientation and alienation. Because she resettled in 
the U.S. as a teenager, Su navigates different cultural contexts with expertise, whether in her 
mostly-American college courses, at the mostly-Burmese church service she attends, or during 
her many drives to appointments with other resettling refugees. Su’s perspectives therefore 
provide important insights into forced migration from the vantage point of having grown up in 
both Myanmar and the U.S.  
When they first moved to Oklahoma, both Myint and Su first lived into an OKC 
apartment complex that hosts many resettling families. The units are often shared by multiple 
families during the early stages of resettlement, and it is not uncommon for more than eight 
people to share a one- or two-bedroom apartment. While Su derived comfort from having her 
family close to her, Myint and her husband had recently moved into a more spacious home 
nearby, which they preferred for its many windows. The two-storied apartment complex hosts 
two central courtyards that residents use as communal gardens; and, since the complex is largely 
composed of international families with diverse gardening skills, each garden contains various 
herbs and vegetables non-native to the United States.   
This apartment complex is located within a census tract in which nearly 15% of the 
population is foreign-born compared to the state average of 10.5%; of the non-U.S.-born 
residents, 64% are from Asia, 24% from Latin America, 10% from Africa, and 2% from other 
places in North America (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). Although I was unable to access a more 
specific breakdown of nationality, the percentage of residents from Asia is more than double 
both the county percentage of 26% and the overall statewide percentage of 28%. Nearly 20% of 
children speak Asian languages at home, while nearly 10% of adults speak Asian languages at 
home. In terms of education, approximately 92% of residents graduated high school, and about 
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39% completed a bachelor’s degree (compared to the statewide averages of 87% and 25%, 
respectively).  
As this demographic breakdown shows, there is a large proportion of Asian residents 
living in the apartment complex and surrounding area. The apartment complex is about two 
miles from the OKC Asian District, which hosts a large Asian grocery store, several smaller 
international grocers, restaurants, and immigrant-owned businesses. Made official by the City in 
2005, the Asian District has been a vibrant fixture in Oklahoma City since 1975 when 
approximately 3,750 Vietnamese refugees resettled in the area (Muzny, 1985). During the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people continued to seek 
refuge in the United States and, due to kin and other social connections, the Asian refugee 
population OKC continued to grow. When working with English as a Second Language (ESL) 
students from the Burmese community, I often heard class members discuss shopping trips to 
Asian grocers for spices, vegetables, and other ingredients that they could not find at American 
grocery stores. Both Myint and Su were pleased that familiar foods were available nearby and 
that seasonal produce was often easier to access in OKC than it was in Myanmar.  
In addition to an established Asian community, Myint and Su were involved with the 
Spero Project, an organization whose mission is to “welcome resettled refugees by connecting 
our new neighbors to people, resources and learning opportunities that make Oklahoma City a 
place of belonging.” The Spero project partners with the Oklahoma City Catholic Charities to 
provide newly arrived refugees with a variety of services such as language learning and 
citizenship courses, accommodation and transportation, and community events that seek to build 
supportive relationships between new neighbors and long-term OKC residents (both American 
and internationally born). The Spero Project is composed of co-Founders Brad and Kim Bandy 
42 
 
along with nine other employees responsible for program development, language learning, after 
school programming, etc. The Spero Project also hosts an initiative called The Common 
Network, which utilizes social media to connect OKC residents with resources and social support 
networks. Recently, the Spero Project connected with the apartment complex, who offered the 
organization space for a classroom; this classroom is currently used for English, history, culture, 
and citizenship classes (where I met Myint and Su), as well as an after-school program and 
special events. 
Unlike many nonprofit service organizations, The Spero Project rejects the “patron-
client” model and instead seeks to embody a neighborly relationship. The Spero Project strives to 
create a partnership between the organization’s employees and the neighbors with whom they 
work, emphasizing mutual growth and reciprocal hospitality. For example, Spero’s website states 
that: 
We [The Spero Project] have in every way been postured to receive welcome from our 
new neighbors with their unique expression of hospitality, community wisdom, and 
strength. Spero’s story is the story of the wonder of welcome that happens when we are 
welcomed into each other’s story and to each other’s tables. (n.d.). 
Uniquely, The Spero Project explicitly acknowledges and values the presence of 
resettling/resettled refugees within the community and seeks to pave avenues for social cohesion 
between OKC residents. As the preceding quote suggests, The Spero Project strives to celebrate 
diversity while also promoting unity across disparate stories and experiences. Both Myint and Su 
used similar language of neighborliness and interpersonal connection when discussing their role 
in their communities.  
Structural Violence in Forced Migration 
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Nonetheless, both Myint and Su experienced different forms of structural violence during 
the processes of their displacement. Farmer (2005) defines structural violence as “a broad rubric 
that includes a host of offensives against human dignity: extreme and relative poverty, social 
inequalities ranging from racism to gender inequality, and the more spectacular forms of 
violence that are uncontestedly human rights abuses” (p. 34). This definition acknowledges the 
many forms structural violence can take, from the overt brutality against Rohingya Muslims in 
Myanmar to the mundane yet chronic food insecurity plaguing those same people in UNHCR-
run refugee camps. According to Jones (2016), violence is endemic to bordering and the border 
system should therefore “be seen as inherently violent, engendering systematic violence to 
people and the environment” (p. 10). Both Jones (2016) and Farmer (2005) emphasize that 
violence is not composed of strictly discrete moments, but that it also becomes embedded within 
the structures that frame everyday lives. In the context of forced migration, it is therefore 
necessary to investigate the structures enabling and enacting violence. 
Interrogating the contexts in which forced migrants move demonstrates the extent of 
structural violence far beyond just the moment of displacement to the moment of resettlement. In 
an analysis of the violence-migration nexus, Bank, Fröhlich, and Schneiker, (2017) argue that 
migration out of conflict zones should be understood as a movement out of violence, through 
violence, and into violence. Like those of Jones (2016) and Farmer (2005), this framework 
recognizes that structural violence is processual. In this section, I position the narratives of Myint 
and Su within this framework to discuss forced migration as a process laden with structural 
violence that extends into both the past and future and stretching across several key locations, 
connecting geographically disparate locations such as Myanmar, Malaysia, and Oklahoma City 
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as pivotal sites in the migration process, while also presenting the interplay between past, 
present, and future in participants’ accounts. 
From Violence: Colonization, Military Junta, and Capitalist Exploitation in Myanmar 
Violence emerges from particular contexts and, for Myint and Su, some of those salient 
contexts include British colonization, Japanese occupation, fifty years of rule by the Burmese 
military (called the Tatmadaw), interethnic conflict, state-sanctioned violence against ethnic and 
religious minorities, and environmental degradation from foreign corporations’ resource 
extraction. Figure 3 shows the timeline of major events in the history of what is now Myanmar 
that contextualize the forced migration of Myint and Su. In the section that follows, I provide a 


















Timeline of Burmese History, 1886 to Present 
1886: Britain claims Burma as a province. 
1937: Britain separates Burma from India and names it a crown colony. 
1942: Japan invades and occupies Burma, and remains until expelled in 1945. 
1948: Burma gains independence from Great Britain 
1962: General Ne Win leads successful military coup, establishing a military junta and national 
socialism. 
1989: The Tatmadaw changes the country’s name to Myanmar, a less ethnically specific term 
than Burma (which refers to the ethnic Bamar majority). 
2008: Government publishes a new constitution allocating 25% of parliamentary seats to the 
Tatmadaw. 
2008: Amidst protests from human rights groups, the Burmese government signs contracts 
allowing four foreign firms to pump gas from Myanmar to China. 
2010: Myanmar elects President Thein Sein in the first election in 20 years, and sporadic 
democratic moves continue through 2013.  
2013-2015: Violence against minority Rohingya intensifies, and hundreds flee to neighboring 
Bangladesh. 
2015: National League for Democracy (Aung San Suu Kyi’s party) is elected into power. 
2016: Aung San Suu Kyi becomes de facto leader. 
2017: Military crackdowns kill thousands of Rohingya and displace hundreds of thousands 
more. 
2018: UN Human Rights Council announces investigation into violence against Rohingya, 
ultimately calling for Burmese officials to face charges for genocidal intent. 
2019: The International Criminal Court (ICC) announces full investigation into alleged crimes 
against humanity; Aung San Suu Kyi leads delegation to the Hague, where she denies 
allegations of genocide. 
January 2020: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules that Myanmar must take action to 
protect the Rohingya. 
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Like most former colonies, many of Myanmar’s contemporary problems can be traced to 
British rule. Great Britain named Burma a province in 1886, following three wars spanning more 
than forty years, before claiming it as a crown colony in 1937 (Seekins, 2017). The role of 
British colonists in integrating then-Burma into a quasi-global economic system is perhaps most 
salient, as it intensified social stratifications and prompted the environmental degradation and 
resource exploitation that I discuss below. Indeed, British companies in Burma set a precedent 
for exporting raw materials for capital gain, building Burmese dependence on exportation and 
introducing economic justification for land-grabbing and displacement (Mark, 2016; Seekins, 
2017). Colonial rule also altered Myanmar’s property rights system, although subsequent laws 
have created an ambiguous legal framework that prompts land tenure conflict often at the 
expense of ethnic minorities (Mark, 2016). Finally, as I discuss shortly, the military junta’s iron-
fist approach to governance is also interwoven with the country’s colonial history.  
When British colonial rule officially ended in 1948, the Tatmadaw responded to the 
“prospect of anarchy and fragmentation” with nationalist rhetoric defending strict order as a 
means of securing long-term independence (Farrelly, 2013, p. 322). The Tatmadaw, whose 
efforts were central to ending British rule, claimed governing legitimacy and, in 1962, completed 
a military coup that consolidated the military junta as the nation’s leader (Farrelly, 2013; 
Callahan, 2012). However, national unity has proven elusive, with ethnic and religious minorities 
facing subjugation. With nearly forty percent of Myanmar identifying as non-Bamar in an 
ethnically Bamar majority, ethnic minorities persistently seek recognition and autonomy. 
However, these efforts often turn violent as different groups vie for land rights and sovereignty, 
in turn legitimating the Tatmadaw’s forceful and violent interventions (Jones, 2014; Kipgen, 
2015). Based on its role in promoting order following British colonial rule, as well as its frequent 
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forceful intervention in quashing ethnic conflict, the Tatmadaw has maintained extensive scope 
in Burmese life for nearly seventy years. 
Based on Myanmar’s complex history as a British colony with ethnically divisive 
borders, as well as the role of the Tatmadaw in prioritizing order over peace, the country 
continues to experience ethnic violence. Nearly 40% of the country is included in the “ethnic 
minority” category of non-Bamar (Jones 2014). Perhaps most notable in terms of recent conflict 
in Myanmar is the ongoing violence against the Muslim minority Rohingya in Rakhine State; at 
the time of writing, Burmese de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi was testifying at the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague, where she vehemently defended the Tatmadaw at 
for their role in perpetrating violence against the Muslim minority Rohingya. From 2017 to 2018, 
approximately 1.1 million refugees were displaced from Myanmar (UNHCR, 2020a). 
Both Myint and Su are ethnic minorities from Kachin State and Chin, respectively. 
Residents of Chin State face discrimination as both ethnic minorities and religious minorities as 
Christians in a majority-Buddhist country. Following the 1962 coup d’état and subsequent 
military rule, Chin people faced mass human rights violations in the form of extrajudicial killing, 
torture, forced labor and relocation, and systematic rape (Jops, Lenette, and Breckenridge, 2016). 
Chin State also has a poor education system, which further disadvantages Chin people who seek 
refuge elsewhere (McWilliams and Bonet, 2016). For Su and the generations of her family that 
lived in Chin State, these contexts formed the primary impetus to seek refuge elsewhere. In 
Kachin State, conflict dates back to resistance to British colonial borders and challenges to 
sovereignty following Burmese independence. The Kachin Independence Organisation and 
Burmese military have engaged in episodic conflict for decades, and the violent context has 
forced thousands of Kachin people to seek refuge elsewhere (Dean, 2005; Sadan, 2015). 
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Finally, capitalist expansion has caused the depletion and exploitation of Myanmar’s 
natural resources including teak trees and natural gas. The Burmese military government has led 
the charge in exporting the country’s natural resources since 1988, often without regard for the 
Burmese people or environmental health (Seekins, 2017). Governmental deals have granted land 
use rights to several foreign firms including in spaces inhabited by Burmese nationals (Perlez, 
2016; Aung and McPherson, 2020). This was regarded as particularly egregious by Myint, who 
remembers vibrant forests and predictable weather patterns where there is now deforestation and 
climatic volatility. For Myint, the permission given by the Burmese government to foreign firms 
to exploit natural resources, displace local communities, and reap the benefits without regard for 
the needs and perspectives of the Burmese people is an unforgivable violence; not only does it 
wreak havoc on the environment without the people’s consent, but it also pits Burmese people 
against each other in vying for land rights. Resource exploitation for capital gain, which is itself 
enabled by British colonization, capitalist expansion, and the military junta’s own prerogatives, 
therefore inflicts structural constraints against the Burmese populace while the military elite and 
foreign investment firms accumulate wealth. These factors converge to create the contexts that 
forced both Myint and Su to seek refuge outside of Myanmar ten years apart, while also 
demonstrating that the process of forced migration begins with the historical conjunctures that 
cause it.  
Through Violence: the “Space of Non-Existence” 
         After deciding to leave Myanmar, Su and her family crossed the border into Malaysia. 
The family lived in a community with many other asylum seekers and stayed in a one-bedroom 
apartment with several families. Su’s father sought work, but neither he nor the rest of the family 
had legal documentation to live in Malaysia. In addition to preventing a stable income, the lack 
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of documentation made the family especially vulnerable to corrupt police officers: on their way 
to purchase soap from the market, Su and her older sister —then both teenagers— were stopped 
and interrogated by a police officer and had to bribe him for their freedom. When retelling this 
story, Su shared how shocked and powerless she felt in that moment, and how the feeling of 
precarity stayed with her while she was in Malaysia; because the family did not have the legal 
papers to defend their presence in Malaysia, they were unable to access any formal protections. 
         Without legal recognition in Malaysia but with the acute need for decent housing, stable 
income, and safety from persecution, Su and her family inhabited what Coutin (2003) calls a 
“space of non-existence,” or a state of being unrecognized —and therefore unprotected— by the 
law. For Su, this space of non-existence was characterized by precarity and exploitation, 
including moments in which the Malaysian state denied Su’s existence —and therefore any 
responsibility to protect her— and moments in which Su was hyper-visible, such as when she 
and her sister were arrested. The undocumented portion of Su and her family’s migration process 
therefore locates structural violence in the state system of documentation and bordering itself 
that enables discriminatory protection and/or neglect (Coutin, 2003; Mountz, 2011, Jones, 2016). 
         In narrating her own move from Myanmar to the U.S., Myint did not describe any similar 
experience of being in a “space of non-existence.” She and her husband were able to register 
with the UNHCR prior to departing from Myanmar and were resettled directly to the U.S. 
without first staying in a third country. However, Myint did discuss concerns for other Burmese 
people living in precarious situations on the border between Thailand and Myanmar. Unable to 
obtain documentation and basic security to resettle in Thailand and unwilling to return to 
Myanmar via a voluntary repatriation process, nearly 100,000 people remain in protracted 
refugee situations; this number does not include the millions of Burmese refugees living in 
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camps in Thailand and Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2020b). With dim prospects in Myanmar, Myint 
wondered: 
How can they go back to Myanmar? There is no house, no land for them. They 
left, they fled to the refugee camp, and some of them either sold their property or 
others have claimed it. So they have no more property, no land, no house. So 
where could they live? 
Stuck between Thailand and Myanmar in impermanent settlements without a clear future 
elsewhere, the lives of these people are plagued by permanent impermanence and liminality 
(Mountz, 2011; Perkins, 2019). 
The global refugee regime is the primary international mechanism for assisting people 
whose government has led to their displacement, and these people therefore rely on that regime 
to realize secure futures. However, the structure of the global refugee regime facilitates just three 
options for permanence: voluntary repatriation, integration into the host country, or resettlement 
in a third country (1951 Convention; 1967 Protocol). The narrowness of the global refugee 
regime leaves people, such as those that Myint mentioned, in prolonged precarity without safe or 
desirable options. Rejected by Thailand, persecuted in Myanmar, and ignored by the 
international mechanisms for assisting refugees to permanent solutions, the people in the camps 
experience bio/necropolitical violence of political inaction (Mountz, 2011; Davies, Isakjee, and 
Dhesi, 2017).   
Moving Into Violence: Extending Violence Into Private Spaces 
Following Bank, Fröhlich, and Schneiker’s (2017) trajectory of forced migration as a 
process from, through, and into violence, this section discusses the structural violence that Myint 
and Su both experienced upon arrival in the United States. The UNHCR, which is responsible for 
facilitating the resettlement of refugees, defines resettlement as “the transfer of refugees from an 
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asylum country to another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them 
permanent settlement” (UNHCR, 2020c). According to this definition, the resettlement process is 
complete upon a refugee’s arrival in whatever State has admitted them through the UNHCR. 
However, both Myint and Su discussed their experiences with resettlement as extending far 
beyond that initial landing. Both Myint and Su continue to navigate the process of establishing 
stable, fulfilling lives as Burmese women in the U.S., despite that Myint has lived in OKC for 
over two years and Su for over a decade. In the following section, I discuss the ways in which 
the U.S. refugee resettlement program prolongs refugees’ process of building sustainable lives, 
the role that vitriolic media plays in that process, and the intimate spaces in which the structural 
violence of the resettlement program are felt. 
The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program 
In 1980, the U.S. Congress signed into law the Refugee Act of 1980. Adopted under 
President Jimmy Carter, the Refugee Act remains the primary legal mechanism for refugee 
resettlement in the U.S. Despite President Carter’s intention for the Act to facilitate coordination 
between Congress and the State Department, it remains largely under the President’s purview; 
indeed, the President enjoys almost total authority to determine resettlement funding, regulations, 
and the yearly ceiling on refugee admissions (Libal, Felten, and Harding, 2019). As such, the 
Refugee Act is particularly susceptible to political change: for example, geopolitical conflict and 
subsequent xenophobia following 9/11 prompted the Bush administration to substantially lower 
refugee admissions, while the Obama administration sought to counter xenophobic narratives by 
raising refugee admissions (Berman, 2011; Capps and Fix, 2015). The refugee resettlement 
program in the U.S. therefore shifts alongside geopolitical contexts and national interest and is 
used as a political tool.  
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Another critical component of the Refugee Act of 1980 is that it constructs a partnership 
between the federal government and voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGS) built on 
promoting refugees’ economic stability. While the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) 
conducts the screening processes of potential resettling refugees, a set of VOLAGS across the 
country organize flights, accommodation, and the dispersal of assistance funds and programs 
(Libal, Felten, and Harding, 2019). VOLAGS are tasked with using federal funds to assist 
resettling refugees in attaining economic self-sufficiency. However, with  only an eight-month 
period to do so before refugees become ineligible for refugee assistance programs, VOLAGS 
must prioritize economic initiatives over other forms of support such as providing English 
courses and trauma-informed mental healthcare, or hosting workshops on U.S. cultural norms, 
systems of transportation, public education, and other U.S.-specific areas refugees might not be 
familiar with. 
Since its inauguration in 2017, the Trump administration’s approach to refugee 
resettlement has become increasingly restrictive and reflective of xenophobic discourse. In the 
first days of his presidency, President Trump halted the refugee resettlement program for 120 
days. Furthermore, the generally high number of refugees resettled to the U.S. has plummeted in 
response to lowered admissions ceilings, with the 1993-2016 average of around 80,000 lowered 
to the 2020 ceiling set at only 18,000 (Blizzard and Batalova, 2019). The figure below shows this 
exponential decrease in refugee admissions since Trump took office (MPI, 2020): 
Figure 5 




Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) analysis of WRAPS data from the State Department 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Available at www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-
and-arrivals/. 
According to a 2019 report by the Refugee Council USA, the 2017-2019 changes in refugee 
policy impacted the entire resettlement infrastructure: in addition to a seventy percent overall 
decline in refugee arrivals since the first half of Fiscal Year 2017, fifty-one resettlement 
programs were closed across twenty-three states, and cities dependent upon refugee arrivals 
faced significant labor shortages (RCUSA, 2019). As the figure below shows, the religious 
composition of refugee admissions into the U.S. has also changed, with the proportion of 
Christian to Muslim immigrants nearly doubling, reflecting the impact of anti-Muslim rhetoric 
on refugee admissions policy (Blizzard and Batalova, 2019). 
Figure 6 




Source: Migration Policy Institute analysis of WRAPS data. Available from 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-
states#Religious_Composition_of_Refugees 
Finally, the Trump administration’s public charge rule entered into effect in February 
2020. Proposed in August 2019, this rule expands the scope of the 1882 Immigration Act, which 
established the “public charge” test as grounds for inadmissibility to the U.S. Under the new rule, 
immigrants applying for green cards or permanent resident status will be denied status change if 
they have used public benefits including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Supplemental Security Income, federal housing 
assistance, or nonemergency Medicaid. This expansion of the public charge rule reflects 
increasingly restrictive immigration policy in the U.S. and has prompted immigrants’ substantial 
disenrollment from benefits (Capps, Gelatt, and Greenberg, 2020). The policy change has also 
impacted refugees in the U.S., with three refugees directly citing the rule as their impetus to 
commit suicide within days of the rule’s announcement and many others disenrolling from 
public benefits out of fear that they will become ineligible for citizenship (Capps, Gelatt, and 
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Greenberg, 2020; Awaad, Dailami, and Noureddine, 2020). Critically, however, the public 
charge rule —even in its most restrictive 2020 iteration— does not apply to refugees or people 
granted asylum in the U.S.. That is, under federal refugee law, the U.S. cannot deny citizenship 
eligibility to a refugee or asylee because they have used public benefits. Language barriers, 
unfamiliarity with U.S. law, and the economic focus of the U.S. refugee resettlement program all 
contribute to miscommunication and lack of comprehension that refugees and asylees are safe 
from the restrictive policy, further compounding the shortcomings of the resettlement program. 
Emotional and Linguistic Disconnect in the Home 
In both Myint and Su’s narratives, the economic focus of the refugee resettlement 
program negatively impacted intergenerational relationships within the home. In Myanmar, their 
homes were vibrant, shared spaces of communication: Myint described the family home as 
bright, airy, and full of activity with her mother, brother and sister-in-law, sister and brother-in-
law, nieces and nephews, Myint’s own three children and their spouses all living in the same 
home, sharing meals, spaces, and daily life; similarly, Su described her home in Myanmar as a 
sunny communal space in a neighborhood that she shared with friends from school and church. 
With multiple generations living together and in close proximity to neighbors with whom they 
have strong relationships, Myint’s and Su’s homes in Myanmar were spaces of comfort and 
connection. 
In the U.S., however, the sanctity of the home was challenged by communication barriers 
that created emotional isolation and disconnect between family members. Myint shared the story 
of a local Burmese teenager who, after suffering from depression and the inability to 
communicate with her Burmese-speaking mother, committed suicide last year. While Myint 
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expressed grief for the entire family and the young woman herself, she was most pained that the 
girl’s mother could not even read the note her daughter left her. Myint, who has three grown sons 
living in Myanmar and who proudly accepts the nickname moji (“grandmother”), perceived the 
home as a space in which families should connect and support one another. However, Myint 
witnessed the ways in which transnational displacement impacts children and parents differently, 
making verbal communication and cultural connection difficult. With her own family remaining 
in Myanmar where their communication was limited to digital platforms, Myint found the 
inability of families to connect more meaningfully through shared language and culture 
especially poignant.  
Similarly, Su grieved her parents’ loss of independence in the U.S.: they never learned to 
speak English, and so depend a great deal on Su and her siblings to assist them with everything 
from doctor’s appointments to taxes and beyond. Su’s parents were happy that their children had 
opportunities for education and careers, but Su worried that their own happiness had been lost 
when they moved to the U.S. The home, which Su and Myint understood to be a site of 
connection and community, therefore became a space also marked by the violence of 
displacement. The border itself manifested in the privacy of the home, drawing boundaries 
between parents and their children linguistically, culturally, and emotionally. 
Ostensibly, these barriers may appear as inevitable side effects of transnational 
movement and comparatively benign to the persecution that Myint, Su, and their families might 
have faced at home. However, Myint and Su’s narratives present the home as a space in which 
“transnational realities intersect to blur the scales of global and intimate” (Hyndman and Mountz, 
2006); colonialism, military violence, capitalist resource extraction, international mobility 
regimes, and all of the other factors that converged to displace Myint and Su also manifest in the 
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intimacy of the home. The structural violence of migration therefore extends across scales, from 
historic injustices to contemporary hardships, with the result that the border itself becomes 
embedded within the home. Furthermore, in focusing refugee resettlement programs on 
economic self-sufficiency, the state ignores the acute and sustained linguistic, emotional, and 
interpersonal needs of the refugees for whom they have accepted responsibility; through its 
inaction, the U.S. therefore aggravates the chronic violence embedded within the migration 
process (Hyndman and Mountz, 2006; Pain and Staeheli, 2014; Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 
2017). 
Agency in Forced Migration 
Whereas the previous section focused on violence itself, this chapter traces participants’ 
agentive responses to those experiences of multiple forms of violence throughout the migration 
process. To understand this agency in its different forms, I follow Ortner’s (2006) assertion that 
agency encompasses not only resistance, but also other interactions with the “relations of power, 
inequality, and competition” in which agents exist (p. 131). Against the structural violence of 
forced migration, Myint and Su both asserted their agency in myriad ways, including 
maintaining relationships with their families, connecting and supporting other people who 
experienced forced migration, and building and pursuing imaginaries of vibrant futures. This not 
only reinforces Brunet-Jailly’s (2005) assertion that structural violence and agency are relational, 
but also demonstrates the ways in which Myint and Su use their own experiences with structural 




Although forced migration is characterized by a lack of choice, it is still a process in 
which Myint, Su, and their families actively engaged. The decision itself to leave Myanmar was 
a monumental step for Su’s parents, whose own families had lived in Chin State for generations, 
as well as for Myint, who left all family except for her husband behind. Indeed, Myint’s decision 
to leave Myanmar was driven by her desire to provide a bridge for her sons to cross into the U.S., 
believing that establishing a home and community in America would make it easier for her 
family to join her. While she certainly misses her family, country, and life in Myanmar, Myint’s 
devotion to her family supersedes her own comfort. Similarly, Su’s parents long to return to 
Myanmar, where they are comfortable with the local language, norms, and people. However, 
according to Su, they left Myanmar and applied for resettlement so that Su and her siblings could 
receive an education, forge lives free from persecution, and one day help to improve Myanmar. 
When describing her parents’ decision to leave Myanmar, Su said: 
My parents, other parents, they already built roots there. They were already planted. And 
then, because of me and my siblings, they ripped those roots out. For us. Even if someone 
wanted to kill them they would stay; it is only for us that they pulled out their roots so we 
could plant ours. 
Even as Su’s family was forced out of Myanmar, her parents were actively making profound 
decisions about what was at stake and how they could care for their children within political and 
economic constraints. 
         Despite the constraint of their choice, Su’s parents and Myint actively wrestled with the 
decision of how much they were willing to tolerate in Myanmar, and that decision ultimately 
revolved around the well-being of their families rather than themselves. Whether it came easily 
or with grueling deliberation, whether they made it with subversion or resistance in mind, or 
whether it was simply an last-ditch effort to survive, the decision to leave Myanmar and seek 
refuge required rejecting the Burmese state and requesting international support. That is, despite 
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their constrained choices and lack of power relative to the Burmese state, Myint and Su’s family 
joined the “more or less organized struggles in which migrants openly challenge, defeat, escape, 
or trouble the dominant politics of mobility” as well as the “daily strategies, refusals, and 
resistances through which migrants enact their (contested) presence – even if they are not 
expressed or manifested as ‘political’ battles demanding something in particular” (Casas-Cortes 
et al., 2015, p. 80). Rather than remain subjects of violence or, perhaps more poignantly, rather 
than allow their families to remain subjects of violence at the hands of the Burmese state, Myint 
and Su’s parents engaged in the inherently political act of crossing international borders (Davies, 
Isakjee, and Dhesi, 2017; Casas-Cortes et al., 2015).    
Replanting 
Even after the initial decision to move, the forced migration process required 
continuously taking “political responsibility for pursuit of a decent life” (Agnew, 2008, p. 176). 
From Su’s family navigating life without documentation in Malaysia through both Myint’s and 
Su’s resettlement in the U.S., forced migration required action despite the political inaction of 
Myanmar, the U.S., and members of the international community (Davies, Isakjee, and Dhesi, 
2017). As I discussed in the section on structural violence within the U.S. resettlement program, 
arrival in the U.S. did not signal the end of the migration process and, as I discuss here, prompted 
myriad ways of challenging the resettlement program’s shortcomings. 
Myint and Su both proudly shared their own successes as well as those of their families 
and friends. Myint’s husband has a well-paying job, so she spends her time homemaking, 
attending or organizing church events, visiting friends in the community, and attending Spero 
Project classes. Myint’s ambition in America is to be a translator and teacher for the families in 
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her community to help bridge the familial disconnects that are so prevalent in the resettling 
community. By using her time to attend English language classes, learn to drive, and build 
relationships with her neighbors, Myint actively invests in her own future as well as that of the 
broader community; while Myint articulates this investment of time and labor as an opportunity 
she is privileged to have, it also enables her to overcome the challenges associated with the 
refugee resettlement program. In doing so, Myint aims to erode the manifestations of border 
violence in the homes of other resettled refugees in OKC. 
Su is similarly driven by the desire to foster relationships of care and support in OKC’s 
Burmese community. As a Spero employee, she spends time connecting with and assisting 
resettled refugee families in OKC; furthermore, with her bachelor’s degree in Family and 
Childhood Development, Su plans to eventually return to Myanmar and open a child 
development center. As I discussed previously, Su’s parents and older sister have struggled to 
adjust to the U.S. due to language barriers and homesickness. Su uses this shared hardship in 
conjunction with her linguistic skills and education to confront the challenges her family faces; 
by translating, encouraging her parents to learn English and take the citizenship exam, and trying 
to preserve as much of her parents’ privacy as possible, Su feels that she is reinvesting in her 
parents’ lives much like they invested in hers by moving to the U.S. 
Future Imaginaries 
         Finally, both Myint and Su constructed future imaginaries, or narratives of what their 
own futures and those of their families might hold. These imaginaries, emerging out of their 
experiences, are reflections of both anxiety and hope and demonstrate the relationality of 
structure and agency perhaps more than any of the preceding discussion. As I will illustrate in 
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this section, the creation of these future imaginaries is indicative of past, present, and anticipated 
structural violence inflicted against them throughout the ongoing migration process; 
simultaneously, these imaginaries reflect participants’ efforts to take “political responsibility for 
pursuit of a ‘decent life’” for themselves, their families, and the broader displaced community 
(Agnew, 2008, p. 176).   
         Both participants narrated concerns about what their futures might hold that were 
intimately linked with their displacement experience. Myint imagined that she might never meet 
her new granddaughter and that her sons would stay in Myanmar without stable employment or 
incomes. This imaginary was also interlaced with prayers for the military regime to relinquish 
control and promote ethnic and religious equality. Myint also voiced fears that other families will 
become emotionally disconnected, that elements of their Burmese and familial cultures will be 
lost, and that the resettlement process will strip away families’ shared values. Similarly, Su 
worried that her parents might reach a level of homesickness where they would return to 
Myanmar for a visit and, without U.S. citizenship, be unable to return. Su also worried that the 
U.S. would reject asylum seekers at its southern border without taking the time to understand 
their circumstances or recognize how constrained their choices are. These fears, which Myint 
and Su project as possible futures for themselves and others, reflect the power of the Burmese 
government to constrain livelihoods, the U.S. government’s unwillingness to adequately support 
refugees, and the ongoing multiple forms of violence that forced migration inflicts in the forms 
of anxiety and fear. 
         Nonetheless, Myint and Su both also created vibrant future imaginaries that directly 
respond to fear and anxiety. For example, Myint responds to her own concerns about familial 
disconnect in the home by taking ESL classes, building relationships with Burmese children and 
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parents alike, and seeking out possible career paths in Oklahoma for her sons. Su also creates 
imaginaries of hope which reflect her nostalgia for her childhood in Myanmar as well as her 
interest in childhood development; when narrating her future, Su envisions leading a childhood 
development center that focuses on education and youth empowerment with locations both in the 
U.S. and in her hometown in Myanmar. While these imaginaries of hope emerge in part as a way 
to assuage anxieties generated by being forcibly displaced, they are also productions of 
possibility and community. That is, these imaginaries are united by their focus on fostering 
interpersonal connection and community well-being in order to counteract the constraints of the 
U.S. resettlement program and the broader structural violence of forced migration. 
Conclusion 
These processes of uprooting, replanting, and imagining futures demonstrate Myint’s and 
Su’s ongoing responses to the violence of forced displacement. Myint and Su were both 
displaced by the Burmese Tatmadaw and the government’s inability or unwillingness to limit the 
Tatmadaw’s power; both Myint and Su’s family navigated the UNHCR bureaucracy to register 
as refugees, and waited uncertainly for resettlement; and both women faced linguistic barriers, 
emotional trauma, and an overall lack of social support from the U.S. resettlement program. 
Despite constrained choices and inhospitable environments, both Myint and Su have responded 
with actions that are not deliberately defiant or subversive, but that challenge injustice 
nonetheless. By learning English, translating for others, teaching, and forging relationships with 
other refugees, Myint and Su reject the biopolitical violence of the Burmese state, the 
international refugee regime, and the U.S. resettlement program, all of which work to 
disempower the women’s lives and communities. In doing so, Myint and Su engage in the 
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“generative struggles” that subvert border violence and engender a “politics of hope” (Brambilla 
and Jones, 2019, p. 15). 
In this chapter, I have positioned the accounts of two Burmese women, Myint and Su, 
who were resettled in Oklahoma as refugees within the structures that govern forced migration I 
traced the migration experiences of Myint and Su out of, through, and into violence, following 
Bank, Fröhlich, and Schneiker’s (2017) conceptualizing of forced migration. I began with 
colonial, capitalist, and military violence in Myanmar that led to Myint’s and Su’s displacement 
before discussing Su’s experience inhabiting a “space of non-existence” in a Malaysian refugee 
community (Coutin, 2003), through to the inadequacies of the U.S. resettlement program and the 
futures both women imagine for themselves. In doing so, I presented structural violence as 




Conclusion: Cultivating Hope 
 Even as the United States militarizes its southern border to deter migration, it continues 
to rely on the labor of undocumented migrants without legal protections (Wiggins, 2020). Even 
as the U.S. participates in imposing structural adjustment plans across the Global South that 
exacerbate inequality and debilitate local economies, it criminalizes the people most negatively 
impacted if they try to pursue a better livelihood elsewhere (Mohan and Chiyemura, 2020). Even 
as the U.S. uses an exclusionary visa system to restrict the access of Brazilians, Indians, Chinese, 
and other nationalities to American citizenship, it relies heavily on those countries’ exports to 
meet American consumption (Oeler and Gompf, 2020; Gibson, 2018). Finally, even as the U.S. 
contributes to conflict in Syria or fails to condemn humans rights atrocities in Myanmar, it 
dramatically reduces its refugee admissions ceiling and refuses responsibility for the millions of 
displaced persons living in refugee camps, crossing treacherous bodies of water, or literally 
dying at the U.S.-Mexico border.  
 The United States was founded on these types of contradictions from the first white 
settlers who, seeking freedom from religious persecution in Great Britain, stole the land and lives 
of Indigenous peoples. As I’ve shown in this thesis, the U.S. government has continued to make 
decisions about who can live on the land it claimed as its own, with the Page Law, Chinese 
Exclusion Act, Operation Gatekeeper, refugee admissions reductions, and the 2020 birth tourism 
regulation being a very select few examples. In securitizing external U.S. borders to restrict 
entrance into the nation, these policies also make decisions about the people living inside the 
U.S.: who is part of the American citizenry and who is not, who can become part of that citizenry 
and who cannot, and what attributes characterize that citizenry.  
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 The 2020 birth tourism regulation aims to decide who can become a part of the American 
citizenship by limiting visas to women who may give birth while visiting the U.S. Furthermore, 
because visas are not required for residents of most Western European nations and Oceania, the 
regulation selectively determines what nationalities can access birthright citizenship. The recent 
reduction in refugee admissions also clearly makes decisions about who can enter and reside in 
the U.S. The birth tourism regulation applies exclusively to women for short term visits of up to 
ninety days, whereas the refugee resettlement program is intended to provide permanent 
residence to refugees generally; nonetheless, both sets of policies rely on the rhetoric of national 
security and the presentation of foreigners as inherent threats to American safety. The birth 
tourism regulation and decreased refugee admissions are therefore both intended to assert U.S. 
national sovereignty, where “national sovereignty” refers to a majority white, capitalist, 
patriarchal society. 
 In asserting national sovereignty as such, the U.S. responds to geopolitical tensions that 
challenge its position as an international hegemony since the end of World War II. Preventing 
people from emerging economies such as India, China, and Brazil from accessing American 
citizenship signals a rejection of those countries as equals, while the reduction in refugee 
admissions simultaneously signals the United States’ refusal to continue filling a long-term 
leadership role in the international refugee regime. Both policies clearly reflect ethnonationalist 
prerogatives and economic protectionism, but also demonstrate unease with perceptions of global 
interconnectedness. 
 In light of this apparent unease in which the U.S. responds to globalization and economic 
integration with protectionism and restrictive immigration policy, I believe that Brambilla’s 
(2015a and 2015b) borderscape concept provides a productive framework for advancing 
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scholarship in opposition to border violence. As Myint and Su’s responses to their experiences 
with forced migration show, border violence is not monolithic but rather comprised of infinitely 
many interacting moments and contexts; as such, there are also many opportunities to challenge, 
reject, or otherwise counter that violence. That is not to dismiss the impacts of border violence in 
any of its manifestations, whether as surveillance of the female body, exclusion of racialized 
bodies, or physical violence including rape, killing, torture, etc.; rather, my point is that even 
within these violent borderscapes, pockets of dissent can exist and, if mobilized, work against the 
violence that has become the status quo.  
For Myint, that mobilization included learning English and working as a translator to 
bring family members closer together, thereby refusing to live within the constraints of the 
economic-focused U.S. resettlement program. For Su, anti-violence mobilization meant 
questioning whether to remain in the U.S. permanently or to take her skills and education home 
to Myanmar, thereby challenging the expectation that resettled refugees should be content with 
whatever provisions they receive from the host country. These are but two examples of Myint 
and Su’s interaction with violent borderscapes, and these two examples alone reinforce 
Brambilla’s argument that interrogating the borderscape can illuminate alternative political 
agencies and subjectivities. 
Finally, I want to conclude by revisiting Su’s description of her parents’ sacrifice: 
My parents, and their parents, they already built roots there [in Myanmar]. They 
were already planted. And then, because of me and my siblings, they ripped those 
roots out. For us. Even if someone wanted to kill them they would stay; it is only 
for us that they pulled out their roots so we could plant ours. 
Su’s statement is undoubtedly full of violence: the political violence of persecution, the physical 
violence of the Burmese military, and the emotional violence of wrenching oneself out the 
homeland. Nonetheless, Su’s statement is also infused with hope: her parents’ hope that their 
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children will live safe and fulfilling lives, and Su’s own hope that, in tending to her parents’ 
hopes for her, she will cultivate new growth for herself, her family, and the broader community 
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